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Abstract
The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auc-
tions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes
of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous
rst-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive
compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted
to mechanisms that rely only on bidders' ordinal ranking of markets, incen-
tive compatibility is characterized and the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer
(1996) is interim incentive ecient. Laboratory experiments were completed
to investigate the existence, stability, and eect on bidder and seller surplus of
cooperative agreements in multiple object simultaneous rst-price auctions.
Collusive agreements stable in the laboratory. The choices of the experimen-
tal subjects often closely match the choices predicted by the ranking and
serial dictator mechanisms presented earlier. However, a few notable excep-
tions raise interesting prospects for the theoretical development of models of
cooperative behavior.
1 Introduction
Collusion by bidders is thought to be a prominent feature of auctions for antiques, sh,
wool, timber, school milk, and oil drainage leases (Cassady (1967), Pesendorfer (1996),
Hendricks and Porter (1988)). In fact, from 1979 to 1988, 81% all of Sherman Act viola-
tions led by the U.S. Department of Justice involved auctions (Froeb (1988)). Bidders
have incentives to coordinate their behavior to increase their surplus by eliminating com-
petition amongst each other. If they can nd an equitable technique for dividing the
spoils from such collusive behavior, bidder rings can be quite successful.
In auctions, bidders are asymmetrically informed; they know their own values for
the objects but not those of the other agents. In order to limit the amount of surplus

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that the auctioneer accumulates, the bidders would like to reach a preauction bidding
agreement. However, any agreement may reveal the bidders' private information, causing
their decisions to change. All bidders face a temptation to increase their one period prots
by defecting from the collusive bidding agreement. Three primary questions which need
to be addressed in the auction setting are:
1. Do bidders form cooperative agreements in simultaneous rst-price auctions?
2. If they do, what sort of strategies do they utilize?
3. How do these strategies eect market eciency, bidder surplus, and seller surplus?
The objective of this paper is to begin grappling with these questions by providing a
theoretical and experimental examination of cooperative agreements in rst-price sealed
bid auctions. While others have already examined collusion in single object auctions
(Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Guth and Peleg (1996)),
other than in Pesendorfer (1996), the properties of collusive behavior in the multiple
object auction environment remains undiscovered. However, multiple object simultane-
ous sealed bid auctions are not completely unfamiliar. For example, auctions for school
milk contracts are held under this procedure (Pesendorfer (1996)). Milgrom (1996) has
recently suggested that simultaneous sealed bid auctions be used for determining the
Carrier of Last Resort (COLR) privileges by the FCC.
Collusion is modeled as the choice of a collusive mechanism by the bidders. Given
that they face a game dened by a series of simultaneous rst-price auctions, bidders
select a mechanism that maps from their valuations for each object to a set of bids in
the auction. While noncooperative (Bayes Nash equilibrium) bidding is one possible
outcome, there are potentially many other, more protable, mechanisms. When side
payments are allowed between bidders, an interim incentive ecient mechanism which
dominates the noncooperative outcome is identied. A class of reasonable mechanisms
may be eliminated on its face. I then examine collusive mechanisms under the restriction
that no side payments may be made between bidders. In the multiple object setting,
the number of potential incentive compatible mechanisms increases signicantly. Three
mechanisms that, in general, dominate Bayes Nash bidding are presented. On a restricted
domain, the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer (1996) is interim incentive ecient. These
ndings suggest that, if given the opportunity, bidders should be able to nd a mechanism
which they prefer to noncooperative behavior (cooperative agreements will be formed)
and that there are some intuitively simple mechanisms that can be predicted as possible
stable outcomes. Laboratory experiments are then conducted that often support these
theoretical predictions. However, in a few experiments, bidders appear to deviate from
theoretical predictions. They choose mechanisms that are not consistent with individual
incentives yet lead to higher prots. These deviations suggest an avenue for future
research.
In Section 2, the general framework of this institution is developed. The tools of
mechanism design are used to develop a model of cooperative behavior in simultaneous
2
rst-price sealed bid auctions in Section 3. The experimental design is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 is a general discussion of the ndings of these experiments. Proofs
and relevant lemmas are provided in Appendix A.
2 The Model
There are n bidders bidding on m objects in m simultaneous rst-price auctions. Bidder
i's valuation for object j is drawn from a continuous distribution F
ij
. It is assumed
that for all i and for all j, F
ij
has a common support given by [v; v], and the density,
f
ij
, is dened and strictly positive. Assume that bidders' valuations in each market are
symmetric, or F
ij
= F
kj
for all i; j; k.
1
Let v = (v
1
; v
2
; : : : ; v
n
) be the vector of individual
valuations where v
i
= (v
i1
; v
i2
; : : : ; v
im
) is the vector of valuations in each market for
individual i. Let b be a vector of bids similarly dened.
The simultaneous rst-price auctions determine an allocation x 2 f0; 1g
mn
and prices
based on the bids placed, where x
ij
= 1 indicates that bidder i has been allocated object
j. Feasibility requires that
P
n
i=1
x
ij
= 1 for all j. The function g : [v; v]
mn
! [0; 1]
mn
determines the probability that each bidder is allocated each object:
g
ij
(b) =

1
k
b
ij
 b
`j
for all `
0 otherwise
where k = #fb
ij
jb
ij
 b
`j
8`g is the number of high bidders. Thus, each object is
allocated to the highest bidder with ties broken randomly. The price paid by each bidder
is given by p : X ! R
mn
which is dened as
p
ij
(x) =

b
ij
x
ij
= 1
0 otherwise.
If a bidder wins an item, then he pays his bid. Let G
ij
(b
ij
) be the expected probability
that a bid of b
ij
by bidder i is highest in market j. Let P
ij
(b
ij
) be the expected price
paid by bidder i for object j when he has placed a bid of b
ij
. Since rst-price auctions
are being modeled, the expected price can be simplied to P
ij
(b
ij
) = b
ij
G
ij
(b
ij
). Assume
that bidders are risk neutral. The expected utility for individual i is given by,
U
i
(b
i
; v
i
) =
m
X
j=1
G
ij
(b
ij
)(v
ij
  b
ij
):
The auctioneer may want to set a reserve price c > v to maximize revenue. For simplicity,
assume that the auctioneer is passive and sets c = v. Also assume that the bidders cannot
resell the objects; the allocation decision of the auctioneer is binding.
1
Many of the results presented here are also true when values are drawn from dierent distributions,
but symmetry is maintained for simplicity.
3
The outcome of noncooperative behavior in this environment has been extensively
studied. The optimal bidding strategy of each player is given by the Bayes Nash equi-
librium of a game with asymmetric information. Maskin and Riley (1996) provide the
most general sucient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Bayes Nash equi-
librium bid function. Given the assumption that F
ij
and f
ij
are strictly positive and
bidders are risk neutral, a unique, monotonic Bayes Nash equilibrium exists. In the case
of symmetric distributions, the symmetric bid function for each bidder is given by the
simple bid function
b
ij
(v
ij
) = v
ij
 
Z
v
ij
v

F
j
(y)
F
j
(v
ij
)

n 1
dy for all i; j (1)
where F
j
(v) = F
ij
(v) for all i.
3 Cooperative Equilibria
If all bidders act noncooperatively, their attempts to outbid each other will give most
of the surplus to the auctioneer. When all bidders' values are drawn from the uniform
distribution, bidders will obtain only 1=n of the surplus. If the bidders can nd an
agreement in which they place very low bids in the auction, they can expropriate most of
the surplus from the seller. However, nding such an agreement is not necessarily an easy
task. In single unit rst-price auctions, collusion is considered to be dicult to sustain.
Robinson (1985) shows that, with commonly known values, collusive agreements are not
stable. However, in an independent private values framework, McAfee and McMillan
(1992) show that collusion is possible. However, Guth and Peleg (1996) note that, by
using repeated play to support their collusive equilibrium, McAfee and McMillan (1992)
diminish the problem of enforcement in their analysis. Guth and Peleg (1996) show
that no collusive mechanism satises both no envy and their weaker form of incentive
compatibility when the item is being sold at the rst-price. However, under more general
conditions, Guth and Peleg (1996) describe equilibrium strategies. They nd that when
the object is being sold in a rst-price sealed bid auction a ring leads to the same prots
for both the buyer and seller as in the competitive case. In their view, the inability of
collusion in rst-price auctions to lead to protable agreements may explain the general
predominance of rst-price sealed bid auctions. In the multiple object setting, however,
the opportunities for collusive equilibria increase.
In order to collude in this auction environment, bidders must come to a voluntary
agreement about what bids are to be placed at the auction (which, in turn, determines
who will be the winner of each item) as well as what sort of side payments are to be made
between members. Assume that bidders can communicate, and that they coordinate their
bidding in each market in some sort of group decision process.
How is this group decision process modeled? Assume that bidders formulate a collu-
sive mechanism. A collusive mechanism is a game played by the bidders, the outcome of
4
which is a set of bids in the auction. As in Laont and Martimort (1998), assume that
the objective of the mechanism is to maximize the expected utility of each bidder.
2
Attempting to characterize the collusive mechanisms that may arise as the outcome
of all possible cooperative games between bidders is a daunting task. Fortunately, by
assuming that any collusive agreement must be compatible with individual incentives,
that search can be drastically limited. The Revelation Principle says that any outcome
which can be attained as the Bayes Nash equilibrium of some mechanism can also be
attained as the Bayes Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism (Gibbard (1973),
Dasgupta et al. (1979)). A direct revelation mechanism is a direct mechanism which
satises individual incentive compatibility (IC).
3
Thus, the outcome of communication
between bidders can be thought of as a mechanism, (; s), which determines the bids
to be placed and the payments to be made between members. In other words,  :
[v; v]
mn
! [v; v]
mn
is a function such that 
ij
(r) species a bid by i in market j. The
function s : [v; v]
mn
! R
mn
species the payment (possibly negative) that each bidder
pays in addition to his bid price if he is the winning bidder. Hence, s
ij
(r) is the payment
bidder i pays in market j.
Assume that bidders decide upon such a mechanism after they have seen their own
values in each market. However, they remain uncertain as to the actual valuations of
the other bidders. No bidder has the ability to coerce another bidder to reveal his
valuation. Thus, all information about individual preferences for markets must come
from the mechanism itself. At the interim stage, each bidder's expected utility is given
by
U
i
(r
i
; v
i
) =
m
X
j=1
G
ij
(B
ij
(r
i
))(v
ij
  B
ij
(r
i
))  S
ij
(r
i
) (2)
where
B
ij
(r
i
) =
Z
r
 i
2V
 i

ij
(r; r
 i
)dF
 i
(r
 i
)
and
S
ij
(r
i
) =
Z
r
 i
2V
 i
s
ij
(r; r
 i
)dF
 i
(r
 i
)
are the reduced form equations which represent the bidder's expected bid and expected
payment. G
ij
is given by the rules of the auction; it is the probability that i's bid is
greater than the n   1 other bids placed. r
i
is the vector of reported values of agent i
and v
i
is i's vector of actual valuations for the j objects being auctioned.
V
i
((; s)jv
i
) is agent i's indirect utility function over mechanisms determined by the
2
Laont and Martimort (1998) examine collusive mechanisms in public goods environments. They
propose that the collusive mechanism is designed by a benevolent planner (or centre). The perspective
taken here is similar, but I aspire to allow the bidders to select the mechanism themselves.
3
A mechanism is direct if the strategy space is equivalent to the type space. In this case, agents
report a vector of valuations r
i
.
5
expected utility attained from maximization of Equation 2:
V
i
((; s)jv
i
) = max
r
i
2[v;v]
m
m
X
j=1
G
ij
(B
ij
(r
i
))(v
ij
  B
ij
(r
i
))  S
ij
(r
i
)
A mechanism satises IC if it is in the best interest of every individual to report his
true valuation for the objects for all possible values that the other bidders might have
(or r
ij
= v
ij
for all i; j).
3.1 Denition (Incentive Compatible) A mechanism (; s) is Incentive Compatible
i U
i
(v
i
; v
i
)  U
i
(r
i
; v
i
) for all r
i
, and for all v
i
.
Assume that bidders do not deviate from the collusive mechanism. While bidders are
able to misrepresent their values within the mechanism, once bids are determined by the
mechanism the bids are perfectly enforced in the auction. This approach may be justied
by repeated play. If bids are placed that are inconsistent with the mechanism, bidders will
use a trigger strategy which punishes deviant bidders. McAfee and McMillan (1992) and
Pesendorfer (1996) use this approach to nd protable collusive mechanisms. Otherwise,
bidders' incentives to increase their bids cannot be avoided. The negative results of
Guth and Peleg (1996) are largely due to the fact that they assume that bidders may
place any bid in the auction. The repeated game approach appears to be consistent with
previous experimental evidence on cooperative agreements (see Section 4). Also, assume
that bidders' values are not ex post observable. After an auction, bidders cannot observe
values in order to determine whether bids were truthful. Therefore, collusive mechanisms
must be independent of actions in previous auctions.
A restriction which makes analysis of the various mechanisms substantially easier is
anonymity, which requires that bidders with the same valuations are treated the same
under the mechanism.
3.2 Denition (Anonymity) A mechanism (; s) satises anonymity i for all permu-
tations  : N ! N; B
i
(v
i
) = B
(i)
(v
(i)
) and S
i
(v
i
) = S
(i)
(v
(i)
) for all v
i
, and for all
i.
As in Ledyard and Palfrey (1994), when examining situations in which agents' valuations
are drawn from identical distributions, it is assumed that mechanisms are anonymous (or
symmetric).
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Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in the appendix justify this approach; by restrict-
ing attention to anonymous mechanisms, when bidders are symmetric, non-anonymous
mechanisms that are socially preferred to anonymous mechanisms are not excluded.
An IC collusive mechanism that is always feasible is the noncooperative mechanism:
bids are placed that are consistent with the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium.
4
In situations in which values are drawn from dierent distributions for the same market, the mech-
anism should be allowed to vary with dierent distributions as well as with dierent values.
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3.3 Example (Noncooperative Mechanism)

ij
(r) = v
ij
 
Z
v
ij
v

F
j
(y)
F
j
(v
ij
)

n 1
dy
s
ij
(r) = 0
4
If bidders cannot nd a collusive mechanism that is preferred to this strategy, there is
little hope for successful collusion. Laont and Martimort (1998) examine, in a public
goods setting, whether some mechanism dominates the noncooperative mechanism. The
objective here is to go a step further by describing the possible mechanisms.
A rst step in determining what mechanisms might be expected is to propose a
reasonable mechanism and investigate its characteristics. A reduced bidding mechanism
is one possibility. Under this mechanism, each bidder agrees to bid some fraction (
j
) of
his value in each market.
3.4 Example (Reduced Bidding Mechanism)

ij
(r) = 
j
r
ij
s
ij
(r) = 0
4
The reduced bidding mechanism represents limited competition between bidders. By
choosing such a mechanism, if the bidders truthfully report their valuations, the objects
will be won by the bidders with the highest valuations, and, if the 's are small, the
cartel will capture most of the surplus. The following lemma characterizes IC reduced
bidding mechanisms.
3.5 Lemma For each market, j, there exists an 
j
2 (0; 1] such that the Reduced
Bidding mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible i
d 
ij
(r
ij
)
dr
ij
= c
j
for all i where
c
j
2 R
+
. Furthermore, 
j
is given by
d 
ij
(r
ij
)
dr
ij
=
1 
j

j
where  
ij
(r
ij
) =
G
ij
(r
ij
)
g
ij
(r
ij
)
.
The implication of Lemma 3.5 is that the only IC reduced bidding mechanisms are those
that yield bidder prots identical to noncooperative bidding.
3.6 Theorem If an IC 
j
exists for all markets then the resulting bid function is equiv-
alent to the noncooperative mechanism.
If 
j
v
ij
is not equal to the noncooperative bid strategy, bidders have an incentive to
increase their reported values to increase their probability of winning in the auction.
Since the cartel members cannot directly observe each other's values, all agents will
7
partake in this destructive behavior as long as they are bidding below the Bayes Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, the only IC reduced bidding mechanisms is the Bayes Nash
equilibrium. This result is similar to Guth and Peleg (1996)'s; any mechanism which
allows for positive bidding must be equivalent to the Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Given that mechanisms of this sort don't seem very realistic, what types of mecha-
nisms might one expect to see bidders select? Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) suggest
that a reasonable class of mechanisms to eliminate are those that are interim dominated
by another mechanism.
3.7 Denition (Interim Dominated) A mechanism (; s) is interim dominated by
(
0
; s
0
) i V
i
((
0
; s
0
)jv
i
)  V
i
((; s)jv
i
) for all i and for all v
i
with at least one strict
inequality.
If the bidders select a mechanism that is interim dominated, even before they learn their
values, bidders would unanimously agree to switch to a mechanism which dominates it.
Interim incentive ecient (Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)) mechanisms are those which
are not dominated.
3.8 Denition (Interim Incentive Ecient) (; s) is interim incentive ecient i
there does not exists another IC, feasible mechanism (
0
; s
0
) such that (; s) is interim
dominated by (
0
; s
0
).
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) show that, if a mechanism is interim incentive ecient,
it can never be common knowledge that another IC mechanism interim dominates it.
Thus, interim eciency is a minimal standard for what is expected as the outcome of a
cooperative process.
5
In order to limit the incentives to misrepresent their valuations as evidenced in the
reduced bidding mechanism, bidders might select one bidder as the sole bidder in each
market. Dene 

as follows.


ij
(v) =

v with probability q
ij
(v)
; with probability (1  q
ij
(v))
where
n
X
i=1
q
ij
= 1 for all j
5
It is likely that the cooperative process would lead bidders to actually select a set of mechanisms
which is a subset of the interim incentive ecient mechanisms. For example, Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983) argue that the appropriate restriction in the face of communication between agents is the concept
of durability (the bidders would never unanimously approve a change from one mechanism to another).
For the sake of this paper, I take the set of interim incentive ecient mechanisms to be a good rst
approximation.
8
and ; indicates that the bidder does not participate in the auction.
6
The function which
determines the side payments as a function of bidders' valuations is now given by t. Let
the class of mechanisms of this form be indicated by B

. Thus, (q; t) is now a new direct
revelation mechanism that denes a bidder's ex post expected utility as
U
i
(r; v) =
m
X
j=1
q
ij
(r)(v
ij
  v)  t
ij
(r);
and interim expected utility as
U
i
(r
i
; v
i
) =
m
X
j=1
Q
ij
(r
i
)(v
ij
  v)  T
ij
(r
i
)
where Q
ij
is the reduced form probability of being selected as the sole bidder and T
ij
tax
is:
Q
ij
(r
i
) =
Z
q
ij
(r
i
; r
 i
)dF
 i
T
ij
(r
i
) =
Z
t
ij
(r
i
; r
 i
)dF
 i
:
The following theorem establishes that attention can be restricted to this particular
class of mechanisms.
3.9 Theorem If (; s) is an incentive compatible direct mechanism such that (; s) 62 B

then there exists an incentive compatible, direct mechanism (
0
; s
0
) 2 B

which interim
dominates (; s).
The set of interim incentive ecient mechanisms lie within B

. Bidding leads to prots
for the auctioneer which necessarily implies losses to the cartel. To achieve the greatests
possible surplus bidders will allocate the object to the bidder who would have won the
same object under the mechanism not in mathcalB

. Then, the bidders can divide up
the gains from not bidding in a manner that does not aect incentives. This is the same
approach taken by Graham and Marshall (1987) when modeling collusion in second-price
auctions. Noncooperative bidding species strictly positive bids for all bidders. The
noncooperative mechanism is not in B

, implying that there exist collusive mechanisms
which dominate it.
3.10 Corollary The noncooperative mechanism is dominated when side payments are
allowed.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) provide an insight into possible mechanisms that might
arise in this setting.
6
A nearly equivalent version would allow one bidder to bid v +  and all others to bid v.
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3.11 Denition (Ex post Ecient) (q; t) is ex post ecient i there does not exist
another mechanism (q
0
; t
0
) such that V
i
((q
0
; t
0
)jv)  V
i
((q; t)jv) for all i, and for all v with
strict inequality somewhere.
7
A mechanism is said to be ex post ecient if it always assigns bidding rights in each
market to the bidder with the highest valuation. Thus, the bidder with the highest
valuation is chosen as the winning bidder with probability one.
3.12 Remark In order for a mechanism to be ex post ecient it must be that for all j,
q
ij
(v) = 1 i v
ij
= maxfv
1j
; v
2j
; : : : ; v
nj
g.
In the single object setting, McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that there exists an ex
post ecient mechanism which can easily be extended to the generic multiple object
environment developed here.
3.13 Example (Ecient Strong Cartel Mechanism)
q
ij
(v) =

1 v
ij
= maxfv
1j
; v
2j
; : : : ; v
nj
g
0 otherwise
t
ij
(v) = (F
j
(v
ij
)
 n
)
Z
v
ij
v
(v
ij
  v)(n  1)F
j
(s)
n 1
f
j
(s)ds+ v
if v
ij
= maxfv
1j
; v
2j
; : : : ; v
nj
g and otherwise
t
ij
(v) =  
[t
ik
(v)  v]
(n  1)
(3)
4
Under this mechanism, the bidder with the highest valuation in each market is selected
and splits between each of the n   1 other bidders the gain in surplus from limiting
competition. Since this mechanism is dependent only upon valuation reports for each
particular market it can be extended to the multiple object setting.
3.14 Theorem (McAfee and McMillan (1992)) The ecient strong cartel mecha-
nism is both incentive compatible and ex post ecient.
When side payments are allowed, there exists a collusive mechanism that allows the bid-
ders to capture all available surplus. Since ex post eciency uniquely characterizes q
(Remark 3.12), it must be that an interim ecient mechanism also satises that restric-
tion. Therefore, the strong cartel mechanism must be interim incentive ecient.
3.15 Corollary The ecient strong cartel mechanism is interim incentive ecient when
side payments are allowed.
7
V
i
is now an agent's ex post utility where all other agents' valuations are revealed.
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3.1 Weak Cartels
McAfee and McMillan (1992) also examine collusive agreements in single object rst-
price auctions that prohibit side payments. A likely explanation for this restriction is
that antitrust laws and the threat of detection make actual side payments extremely
risky, if not impossible. It is hard to imagine a large rm actually transferring funds
to another rm. Thus, the only method for collusion is the division of bidding rights
in various markets. Assume side payments are not possible.
8
Under these weak cartel
agreements, McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that the best mechanism for a ring of
bidders is one in which they all place identical bids, or they commit to a rotation scheme
that randomly chooses an exclusive bidder. Such rotation schemes are often called phases
of the moon agreements (Bane (1973)). In the mechanism design model just developed,
such a restriction can be implemented by requiring that no transfers are made.
3.16 Assumption (No side payments) t
ij
(v) = 0 for all i and for all j
Let B
s
be the subset of B

such that Assumption 3.16 is satised. A mechanism with
no side payments cannot be ex post ecient since the condition given by Remark 3.12
violates IC. The following result is a generalization of the result of Dudek et al. (1995).
3.17 Theorem Let G
ij
(r) =
Q
k 6=i
F
kj
(r). If there is some i such that G
ij
(v^
ij
) 6= G
ij
(v
ij
)
for some positive v^
ij
; v
ij
2 [v; v], then there does not exist an IC (; s) in B
s
such that it
is ex post ecient.
Without the extra lever of side payments, the cartel cannot ensure that the bidder with
the highest valuation is chosen. Every bidder (even the lowest types) must be given
some positive probability of being chosen as the sole bidder. Therefore, there will always
be mechanisms in B

that (ex post) dominate mechanisms without side payments. If,
instead of comparing mechanisms in B
s
to all other mechanisms, attention is restricted
to mechanisms only in B
s
, then any mechanism is ex post ecient. Raising any bidder's
probability that he is the sole bidder in some market (given that all type information
is revealed) necessarily requires lowering other bidders' probabilities of being the sole
bidder. The decreased probability of winning cannot be oset by side payments as it is
in the strong cartel situation.
Unfortunately, examining all possible mechanisms in B
s
is still a very dicult task
due to the multi-dimensionality of each bidder's type (each bidder's type is an m-tuple
of valuations). While Rochet (1987) provides necessary and sucient conditions for a
mechanism to be IC in very general multi-dimensional settings, nding the interim incen-
tive ecient mechanism in this class is still not trivial. I proceed by proposing a potential
collusive mechanism in B
s
. In the single object setting, McAfee and McMillan (1992)
show that random assignment of a winning bidder is the only IC collusive mechanism
without side payments other than the noncooperative outcome. The random assignment
mechanism generalizes their result to the multiple object setting.
8
Assume that side payments are illegal and that this prohibition is perfectly enforced.
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3.18 Example (Random Assignment Mechanism)
q
ij
(v) =
1
n
(4)
4
The random assignment mechanism is IC since it does not depend upon any individual
information. Three procedures describe how bidders might arrive at the probabilities
specied by this mechanism. First, in each market, the group could randomly select a
sole bidder. Second, if the auctioneer randomizes amongst tie bids, all bidders could
simply agree to place identical bids of v in each market. Finally, when F
ij
= F
kj
for all
i; j, and k and the auction is repeated many times, the assignment mechanism could also
be approximated by each bidder bidding in only one market for all periods.
Is it the case that even this simple mechanism interim dominates noncooperative
bidding? For some distributions there will always be values for which bidders prefer the
noncooperative mechanism to the random assignment mechanism. Consider an example
where v
ij
2 [0; 1] and F
ij
(v) = v
1=3
for all i. The Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function is
given by
b
ij
(v
ij
) =
n  1
n+ 2
v
ij
:
For any v
ij
, a bidder's expected utility from the random assignment mechanism is
1
n
v
ij
.
A bidder will prefer the noncooperative outcome in market j if
v
ij
>

n+ 2
3n

3
n 1
: (5)
For n > 1, there are feasible values which satisfy this condition. As n increases, the right
hand term of Equation 5 approaches 1. In general, as the set of bidders grows, the set of
values under which the noncooperative mechanism is preferred to the random assignment
mechanism shrinks.
3.19 Theorem As n!1, the set of v such that all bidders strictly prefer the nonco-
operative mechanism to the random assignment mechanism shrinks to a set of measure
zero.
Only bidders with high valuations will prefer the noncooperative outcome. However, as
n increases, it is more likely that there are other bidders with high values. This makes
the Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy less protable. If F
j
is convex for all markets, the
random assignment mechanism will dominate the Bayes Nash equilibrium mechanism
(i.e. random assignment will be preferred for all values). A convex F
j
implies that higher
value draws are more likely, which encourages bidders to bid closer to their values in the
Bayes Nash equilibrium. An implication of Theorem 3.19 is that for the single object
case the random assignment mechanism is interim incentive ecient. For all symmetric
distributions, there is a non-zero cut-o between preference for the random assignment
12
mechanism and the noncooperative mechanism. However, the noncooperative mechanism
is the only other incentive compatible mechanism. Thus, random assignment cannot be
dominated.
9
3.20 Proposition When m = 1, the random assignment mechanism is interim incentive
ecient.
The fact that bidders are more likely to prefer the random assignment mechanism to
noncooperative bidding when n is large is opposed to conventional wisdom on collusive
behavior. Both experimentally and empirically, cartelization is thought to be much easier
in small groups. However, as the group size increases, the benets from noncooperative
behavior shrink signicantly.
While random assignment mechanisms are the only IC collusive mechanisms in the
single object environment, other IC mechanisms are available in the multiple object
environment. Bidders may use more sophisticated rotation schemes which utilize the
increased dimensionality of the type space to increase eciency. Bidders are willing to
trade-o probability of winning a lower valued object for increased probability of winning
a higher valued object. These mechanisms are characterized by the strategic choice
of sole bidders for each market based upon their reported values. The serial dictator
mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), Olson (1991)) is an example of a
rotation scheme.
3.21 Example (Serial Dictator Mechanism) For each random permutation of bid-
ders: (n
1
; n
2
; : : : ; n
m
), where n
k
= i indicates that bidder i selects in spot k,
q
(n
k
)j
=

1 j = R(n
k
)
0 otherwise
(6)
(7)
where R(n
k
) is dened iteratively as follows. Let R(n
0
) = ; and for k  1
R(n
k
) = arg max
j2f1;:::;mgn
S
k 1
i=1
R(n
i
)
fv
(n
k
)j
g:
4
The serial dictator mechanism selects the order in which each bidder is allowed to select
the market in which he is the sole bidder. Each bidder is a dictator over the outcomes at a
single point in time. Assume that the choice of which bidder is selected as a dictator at any
point is random.
10
If there arem objects and n bidders, the probability that any bidder is
selected to be the dictator for market i is 1=m. In the example described by Figure 1, there
are ve bidders and ve objects. The numbers indicate each bidder's relative ranking of
9
Any randomization will be IC, but only the random assignment mechanism satises anonymity.
10
This is necessary to maintain anonymity.
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Bidder
1 2 3 4 5
A 1 3 3 5 5
B 2 5 2 3 2
Market C 3 2 1 1 1
D 4 1 4 2 3
E 5 4 5 4 4
Figure 1: An example
his values. If the random draw of dictators yields the order (1; 2; 3; 4; 5), then bidder 1
would select rst and choose market A, 2 would select market D, 3 would select C, 4 would
select B, and 5 would have no choice but to select market E. When the number of objects
is less than or equal to the number of bidders, the serial dictator mechanism requires that
each bidder be selected at most one time. The number of possible allocations predicted
by the serial dictator mechanism can be large. In principle, each dierent permutation
of the dictator order could lead to a dierent outcome.
11
Thus, the number of possible
orderings, n!, acts as an upper bound on the number of possible outcomes.
The serial dictator mechanism is IC because stating one's true valuations maximizes
the probability that higher valued objects are chosen rst. The serial dictator mecha-
nism highlights the increased richness of the set of possible mechanisms when examining
multiple object auctions. More importantly, the multiple object environment makes the
random assignment mechanism an inferior choice.
3.22 Proposition The serial dictator mechanism interim dominates the random assign-
ment mechanism.
In an assignment model, Olson (1991) shows that the serial dictator mechanism is ex post
ecient when considering implementation in Nash equilibria. However, I am examining
implementation of mechanisms in Bayes Nash equilibria. Therefore, it is possible that
other mechanisms may exist which interim dominate the serial dictator mechanism.
Ideally, I would continue examining generic weak cartel mechanisms. However, the
serial dictator mechanism suggests a class of mechanisms that seem particularly reason-
able as a rst guess at the expected choice of mechanism in this setting and are easier
to analyze. They are ordinal mechanisms which rely only on each individual's ranking
of his markets.
3.23 Denition (Ordinal Mechanism) Let M = f1; 2; : : : ; mg. Let f : [v; v]
mn
!
M
mn
be a function dened as
f(v
ij
) = k () #fv
il
: v
il
 v
ij
g = k   1:
11
Although that is not necessarily true. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which only one solution
is possible. For example, suppose each bidder's maximal valuation is in a dierent market. Then, for
any combination, each bidder will select the market he ranks highest.
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q is an ordinal mechanism i for all v and v
0
f(v) = f(v
0
) ) q(v) = q(v
0
):
When a mechanism is ordinal, both q and the reduced form probabilities Q can be
expressed as a function of each agent's ranks of the markets. Since any incentive com-
patible collusive mechanism will not be ex post ecient (Theorem 3.17), it must be that
the mechanism makes limited use of the bidders' information. Also, when m = 1, in order
to satisfy IC, the mechanism must not depend on any private information. Ordinal mech-
anisms are one class of mechanisms that satisfy these constraints. There may be other
incentive compatible mechanisms that use more information than ordinal mechanisms.
However, as a rst cut, the possible mechanisms given this restriction are examined.
When considering ordinal mechanisms, IC is characterized by the following proposition.
3.24 Proposition Any ordinal mechanism q is Bayesian Incentive Compatible i for all
i,
1. Q
ij
is decreasing in the ranks (i.e. Q
ij
(m
i
jm
ij
= 1)  Q
ij
(m
i
jm
ij
= 2) : : : 
Q
ij
(m
i
jm
ij
= m)), and
2. (Q
ij
(m
i
jm
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
i
jm
ij
= p)) = (Q
ik
(m
i
jm
ik
= l) Q
ik
(m
i
jm
ik
= p)) for all
j; k and for all l; p.
The rst condition is a standard IC constraint that says a bidder will be willing to place
each market in its proper rank only if doing so results in an increase in his probability
of winning that object. The second condition constrains how the mechanism may vary
across markets. The relative dierences in Q between each rank must be the same in
each market. Otherwise, there may be values for which the bidder would prefer to change
his reported ranks.
The random assignment and serial dictator mechanisms are IC ordinal mechanisms.
Pesendorfer (1996) suggests another ordinal mechanism that satises Bayesian incentive
compatibility: the ranking mechanism. Bidders submit reports of their ranks.
12
Then,
the bidder with the highest rank is selected in each market as the sole bidder in that
market. If more than one bidder happens to report the same rank, then the sole bidder is
chosen at random from those bidders. The example in Figure 1 is an illustration of such
a mechanism. The ranking mechanism would select bidder 1 as the sole bidder in market
A, either 1, 3, or 5 in market B, either 3, 4, or 5 in market C, 2 in market D, and 2, 4,
or 5 in market E. Three features of the ranking mechanism are apparent. First, bidders
can be selected as the sole bidder in more than one market. In this example, bidder 5
could potentially be selected as the bidder in three markets. It is possible that bidder 3
not be selected at all. Second, the sole bidder's rank can be very low. For example, in
12
If one wishes to stick to the strict denition of a direct mechanism, imagine bidders submitting their
valuations and some cartel centre ranking their values. Bidders are indierent between reporting their
true valuations and reporting any other order-preserving set of valuations.
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market E, the potential winning bidders' ranks are all 4, indicating that their valuations
are likely to be quite low.
3.25 Example (The Ranking Mechanism)
q
ij
(m) =

1
k
m
ij
 m
`j
for all `
0 otherwise
where k = #f`jm
`j
= m
ij
g is the number of bidders who ranked market j the same as
i. 4
The reduced form probabilities for each bidder and each market are given by
Q
ij
(m
ij
) =
n
X
k=1

1
k

(n  1)!
(k   1)!(n  k)!

1
m

k 1

m m
ij
m

n k
: (8)
Under the ranking mechanism, each agent's probability of being selected as the sole bidder
in a particular market is independent of his ranks for the other markets. Obviously, the
ranking mechanism satises incentive compatibility since the interim probability of being
selected as the sole bidder is decreasing in the ranking. The probability that an individual
is selected as the bidder in any particular market is simply the probability that no one
ranked that market higher than he did, which is clearly decreasing in his ranking (for
higher ranks (m
ij
) each term in Equation 8 is smaller).
For a xed number of bidders, Pesendorfer (1996) shows that expected eciency
converges to 100% as the number of markets increases.
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The ranking mechanism will
always select a bidder who ranked a particular market the highest as opposed to the serial
dictator mechanism which may, due to the order of draws, select a bidder who does not
have a high rank. Thus, in expectation, bidders' valuations should be higher. In fact,
the ranking mechanism is an interim incentive ecient ordinal mechanism.
3.26 Theorem If v > (n  1)v, the ranking mechanism is interim incentive ecient in
the class of all anonymous ordinal mechanisms without side payments.
If v = 0, then the condition on the support of the distribution is satised for all n.
This suggests that, if a group of bidders are deciding on how to collude, they may very
well want to pick the ranking mechanism since no other mechanism can do better for all
possible values.
14
13
Bidder surplus as a percentage of the maximum possible surplus can be readily substituted for
eciency in these situations since bidders are essentially bidding zero which implies no seller's surplus.
14
A similar result likely holds for asymmetric distributions and a slightly redened ranking mechanism
where the probability a bidder is assigned a market when there is a tie is dependent on his distribution
of values in that market. However, the current version of the proof relies heavily upon the anonymity of
the mechanism.
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There may exist other (non-ordinal) mechanisms which dominate the ranking mecha-
nism. Since the noncooperative mechanism is not an ordinal mechanism, it is even possi-
ble that it may dominate the ranking mechanism. However, since the ranking mechanism
dominates random assignment, Theorem 3.19 can be applied to the ranking mechanism:
the ranking mechanism is not dominated by noncooperative bidding.
3.27 Corollary As n!1, the set of v such that all bidders strictly prefer the nonco-
operative mechanism to the ranking mechanism shrinks to a set of measure zero.
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) suggest a stronger standard which may be more
logical when a decision rule is chosen in the interim stage. A mechanism is durable if
the agents would never (for all possible draws of values) unanimously approve a change
from that mechanism to another mechanism. Interim incentive eciency guarantees
that, from an ex ante perspective, the mechanism will not be blocked. However, once
agents have observed their values, one agent (not knowing that the others will prefer a
new mechanism) may propose a change which is unanimously accepted. Corollary 3.27
suggests that the ranking mechanism may not be durable. There are always distributions
such that for some values all agents prefer the Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy to the
ranking mechanism.
3.28 Proposition For all n andm, there exist distributions such that for a set of positive
measure the Bayes Nash equilibrium is unanimously preferred to the ranking mechanism.
This, however, does not mean that the ranking mechanism is not durable. Holmstrom
and Myerson (1983) model durability by a specic voting game. It is necessary to con-
sider what the bidders would learn if they unanimously approved a change to another
mechanism. For example, if all bidders agreed to move from the ranking mechanism to
the noncooperative mechanism, then each bidder could infer that everybody had high
valuations. This updated information, however, would cause them to bid higher in the
Bayes Nash equilibrium, making it a less attractive agreement. Consider an example
where m = 1 and n = 2. Let v
i
2 [0; 1] and F
i
(v) = v
1=2
. Both bidders will prefer the
Bash Nash bidding only if v
i
> 9=16. However, if the bidders condition their bids on the
fact that their opponent has a value above 9=16, they will bid so high that they will no
longer prefer noncooperative behavior. Unfortunately, the ranking mechanism does not
satisfy the sucient conditions given by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) for a mechanism
to be durable. Thus, the question of whether there are any durable collusive mechanisms
without side payments remains open.
Clearly, collusive agreements will most likely involve selecting a sole bidder to bid in
each market. When side payments are allowed, an ex post ecient mechanism exists.
However, with no side payments, ex post eciency cannot be achieved. The fact that
bidders are bidding on multiple objects allows them to choose a collusive agreement that
yields higher expected surplus (and eciency) than the best IC mechanism in the single
object case (random assignment). The serial dictator and ranking mechanisms are two
ordinal mechanisms which interim dominate the random assignment mechanism. This is
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only a partial analysis of the outcomes of collusive behavior in the multiple object setting.
There remain many unanswered questions. For example, what is the full characterization
of interim incentive ecient mechanisms? Also, what is the impact of communication
and repeated play on the choice of strategies?
While the ranking mechanism is an interim incentive ecient mechanism (in the
class of ordinal mechanisms), the serial dictator mechanism may have an advantage
due to its simplicity. The structure of the serial dictator mechanism is similar to a
typical description of a bidder ring in which each bidder takes a turn (in a ring) picking
what he wants to bid on (Cassady (1967)). However, this intuitive simplicity is at the
cost of expected eciency. Both these rotation schemes interim dominate the random
assignment mechanism. On the other hand, the random assignment mechanism would
be extremely simple for a group of bidders to utilize and monitor. An experimental
examination of this mechanism design problem will give some initial insight into this
trade-o between eciency and simplicity.
4 Experimental Design
In the previous section, it was shown that dierent forms of collusive strategies could be
used in multiple object simultaneous rst-price auctions. A few strategies highlighted as
possible choices by bidders are:
 Competitive bidding,
 Reduced bidding,
 Random assignment, and
 Rotation schemes (serial dictator or ranking).
The theory suggests that some of these mechanisms will most likely be preferred to oth-
ers. For example, both the particular rotation schemes examined, the serial dictator and
ranking mechanism, interim dominate the random assignment mechanism. Reduced bid-
ding agreements are generally only IC if they yield the same protability as competitive
bidding.
In the analysis of Section 3, some possible collusive mechanisms are discussed given
the assumption that bidders have agreed to cooperate. Will bidders actually decide to
form cooperative agreements? In this vein, the experimental literature on cooperative
behavior provides some initial insights. As is the case in prisoners' dilemma or public
goods experiments, there are incentives for participants to coordinate their behavior to
increase their overall payos. However, each participant also has an incentive to defect
from any cooperative agreement. While only Isaac and Walker (1985) examine collusive
18
behavior in sealed bid auctions,
15
numerous other experimental studies have highlighted
three factors that appear to aect the ability of groups to cooperate:
1. Communication,
2. Repeated play, and
3. Institutional structure.
In general, participants cannot form successful cooperative agreements unless they are
given an opportunity to communicate and coordinate their strategies. Isaac et al. (1985)
found that allowing communication in a public goods experiment led to a small but stable
increase in the amount contributed to the public good. Daughety and Forsythe (1987)
found that, with written communication, experimental subjects made choices closer to
the collusive optimum. In addition, the method by which communication is allowed
appears to be important. For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) found that in a
public goods experiment, where binary signals were the only form of communication
allowed, the resultant behavior was no more ecient, despite the fact that participants
conditioned their behavior heavily on the signals. This suggests that the more extensive
the communication that is allowed, the more likely it is that stable, cooperative outcomes
will be observed. The psychology literature has focused on the ability of group discussion
to change individual choices (Pruitt (1971)). Numerous psychological factors can play
important roles in the ability of a group discussion to lead to outcomes that are preferred
by the group but may be contrary to individual incentives (i.e. providing a public good
or participating in a cartel).
Repeated interaction appears to be a signicant factor in the eectiveness of cooper-
ation. If participants meet only one time, there is little incentive to choose a cooperative
outcome. However, cooperative choices can be supported in repeated settings through
the use of trigger strategies or Tit-for-Tat type behavior. Selten and Stoecker (1986)
report a signicant end-game eect in which participants tend to defect from cooperative
agreements when they know the end of the experimental session is near. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1994) compare games in which participants in a public goods experiment are
repeatedly matched with dierent individuals to games in which participants repeatedly
interact with the same individual. They nd that contributions increase slightly under
the repeated treatment.
The institutional structure of the environment can drastically aect the level of coop-
eration observed. The best example of such a contrast is the dierence in the eectiveness
of collusion in double auction, posted-oer, and sealed bid auction institutions. Isaac
et al. (1984) and Clauser and Plott (1992) report that collusive agreements are more
successful when sellers can place posted oers. In the double auction environment, in
which each participant can change the current oer at any time, collusive eorts almost
always break down. However, Isaac and Walker (1985) show that collusive agreements
15
Kagel and Roth (1995) describe a series of in-class experiments that Kagel conducted with common
values.
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are relatively stable in sealed bid rst-price auctions. In 7 out of 10 experiments, stable
collusive agreements developed. One explanation for the contrast in the success of collu-
sion under these various institutions is that in the double auction there is a continuous
incentive to defect from the cooperative agreement. However, in both the posted-oer
and sealed bid auctions, participants only make a single, binding decision; if they do
not deviate when making that decision, it is impossible for them to deviate until the
next period. In addition to communication and repeated play, the overall susceptibility
of the underlying economic environment to cooperation should also be considered when
determining the likelihood of cooperative results.
The multiple unit simultaneous sealed bid auction combines all of the above factors to
create a situation that is conducive to cooperative outcomes. First, bidders are allowed
to verbally communicate. Second, bidders repeatedly interact with the same individuals
and, in most cases, do not know when the experiment will end.
16
Finally, the institution
is an extension of the sealed bid auctions studied by Isaac and Walker (1985), which are
susceptible to collusion.
With this previous experimental work in mind, stable and successful cooperative
agreements are expected to form. However, participants can choose among many dierent
cooperative strategies that vary signicantly in their relative sophistication. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1994) note that, despite the increase in contributions from repeated play,
participants fail to use sophisticated and more protable strategies. However, when
bidders are allowed to communicate, Isaac and Walker (1985) nd that some groups
attempt to use more sophisticated strategies where the bidder with the highest value is
picked. The primary objective of this experimental study is to determine what types of
strategies bidders are actually using in this environment. Also, as shown in Section 3,
when side payments are not allowed these strategies are not expected to lead to ex post
ecient auctions. The choice of collusive mechanism will aect the nal eciency of the
auction as well as the surplus of both the bidders and the seller. In order to provide a
better understanding of collusive agreements in rst-price auctions, a series of laboratory
experiments was designed that allowed for observation of bidders' choice of collusive
mechanism.
Subjects for these experiments were students at the California Institute of Technology.
All subjects participated in only one experiment. Experiment instructions can be found
in Appendix B. The simultaneous rst-price auctions were implemented on auction
software designed by Wes Boudeville and Dave Porter.
In each experiment, ve bidders participated in 5 simultaneous single unit rst-price
auctions. In the rst 5 periods of each experimental session, no communication was
allowed. In the next 13-18 periods, subjects were allowed to communicate between each
period.
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Two experiments were conducted in which the nal period was announced in order to test the
end-game eect.
20
Bidders were required to place a bid of at least one experimental dollar (franc) in
each market.
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This restriction ensured that subjects were unable to monitor adherence
to collusive agreements via the sound of computer keys being hit for the submission of
bids. Also, this allowed the experimenter to easily determine when all the bids had been
placed. If ties occurred in the highest bids, the computer software randomized between
the high bidders to determine the winner.
4.1 Communication
After the fth period it was announced that communication would be allowed between
bidders. The following statement was handed out and read to subjects, who were then
allowed to ask questions.
Communication with Other Participants
Sometimes in previous experiments, participants have found it useful when
the opportunity arose, to communicate with one another. You are going to
be allowed this opportunity while the computers are reset between periods.
There will be some restrictions.
You are free to discuss any aspects of the experiment (or the market) that
you wish, except that:
 You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private information
on your value sheets.
 You are not allowed to discuss side payments or to use physical threats.
Since there are still some restrictions on your communications with one an-
other, an experimenter will monitor your discussion between periods. To
make this easier, all discussions will be at this site.
Remember, after the computers have been reset between periods (and the
next period has begun) there will be no discussion until after the end of the
next period.
We will allow a maximum of 4 minutes in any one discussion session.
Subjects were also told that the number of rounds had been xed. This announcement
was intended to make bidders aware that there was no trade-o between conversation
and number of periods (and thus prots). In most experiments, subjects had no problem
understanding the limitations of their communication and only occasional reminders (or
clarications about the form of acceptable information) were required.
4.2 Information Conditions
The limited information environment was the most restrictive information condition uti-
lized by Isaac and Walker (1985). The only information available to participants was
17
The conversion rate of francs to dollars was either 250 or 500. Thus, a minimum bid of 1 franc was
generally a trivial amount.
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the identity of the winning bidders and the prices they paid. A second, more limited,
information condition not used by Isaac and Walker (1985) was the zero information
condition which reported only the winning bids to the bidders. The identity of the win-
ning bidder in each auction was unknown to everyone except the winner. Under the zero
information condition, the participants could only determine who had placed winning
bids through voluntary discussion. The increased diculty in identifying and punishing
deviant bidders was expected to make the zero information condition less conducive to
cooperative behavior.
4.3 Symmetry
In the symmetric environment, valuations for all ve markets and bidders were drawn
from the same distribution. Integer values between 1 and 1000 were drawn using the
discrete uniform distribution. Under the assumption that bidders are risk neutral, the
unique, symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function is:
b
ij
(v
ij
) = :8v
ij
for all i; j:
Since the bid functions are symmetric and strictly monotonic, under competitive bidding
the auction is expected to be ex post ecient.
18
4.4 Asymmetry
In the asymmetric environment, valuations for four of the markets for each bidder were
drawn from the same discrete uniform distribution with values between 1 and 1000. In the
fth market, valuations were drawn from a rst-order stochastic dominant distribution,
F (v) =
v
2
1000
2
, taking values between 1 and 1000 as well.
19
In each market, one bidder
had a valuation drawn from this preferred distribution. The identity of that bidder was
announced to all participants.
When bidders are behaving noncooperatively, the Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function
can be estimated numerically. Figure 2 is a plot of the estimated bid functions for each
market when bidders have values drawn from the above distributions.
20
If bidder 1 has
values drawn from the stochastically dominant distribution, b
1
(v)  b
i
(v) for all other i
and for all valuations. Thus, competitive bidding will not necessarily lead to full eciency.
However, in this case, the expected eciency of competitive bidding is extremely close
to 100% (at 99.983%).
18
An auction is ex post ecient if the winning bidder has the highest valuation for the object.
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The discrete analog to this distribution was actually used.
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BIDCOMP2, a program developed by John Riley, was used to estimate these bid functions.
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Bid Functions
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4.5 End of Experiment Changes
In order to determine whether communication or repeated play were important factors
in the success of collusive agreements, two changes at the end of 5 of the 10 experiments
were implemented. The rst change was intended to determine the value of repeated
play in this environment. Since it was not practical to conduct experiments in which
cartel members did not repeatedly interact as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994), the end-
game eect (EG) was studied (Selten and Stoecker (1986)). At the end of experiments
six and seven, it was announced that one more period would be conducted. In this
nal period, communication was allowed but otherwise complete anonymity was induced.
Bidders drew their values randomly from a set of ve envelopes. The identity of the
winning bidders and their exact earnings were unknown to the experimenter and the
other subjects.
21
The second treatment was designed to demonstrate the importance of communication.
In experiments 8 through 10, subjects were told at the beginning of their discussion for
period 18 that it would be the last period of discussion (the experiment lasted for ve
periods beyond that).
22
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Daughety and Forsythe (1987)
report that, while cooperation is greater with prior communication (PC) than with no
communication, once communication ends the level of cooperation tends to gradually
erode.
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Both of these changes were made near the end of the experimental session and sub-
jects did not have any a priori knowledge of these treatments. Thus, observations of
cooperative agreements in earlier periods should not be aected by either the EG or PC
treatment.
5 Experiment Results
Ten experiments were completed with six experiments utilizing the symmetric environ-
ment and four using asymmetric valuation draws. Six experiments were conducted under
the limited information setting; four experiments used the more limited zero information
condition. A general summary of the experiments can be found in Table 1.
Subject earnings averaged $33.75 across all experiments. No experimental session
lasted longer than two hours, with the average length closer to one hour and thirty min-
21
A third party not involved with the experiments paid the subjects for that period by placing their
earnings in envelopes marked with an ID known only to the bidder.
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In experiment 10, discussion was ended after period 17 and 6 periods without communication were
completed.
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Actually Isaac and Walker (1988) found that in 3 out of 4 experiments in their rst experimental
series no participants defected from the collusive agreement after communication was ended. However,
in their second set of experiments, contributions declined in 11 of 17 experiments.
24
Number of Information
Exp. Periods Environment Condition
1 20 Symmetric Limited
2 22 Symmetric Limited
3 22 Symmetric Limited
4 22 Symmetric Limited
5 20 Asymmetric Limited
6 20 Asymmetric Limited
7 20 Asymmetric Zero
8 18 Asymmetric Zero
9 18 Symmetric Zero
10 17 Symmetric Zero
Table 1: Experimental Design
utes. There was no signicant variance of subject prots between and within periods.
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The behavior of the bidders in the rst ve periods of the auction, when communi-
cation was not allowed, was roughly similar to previously observed results. In previous
experiments, bidders bid somewhat above the bid predicted by the risk neutral predic-
tion (Cox et al. (1988)). However, for extremely low valuations where bidders have little
chance of winning, they typically place extremely low bids (often 0). The estimation of
a simple linear regression on the bids placed in the auctions with symmetric valuations
demonstrates the similarity of the initial ve periods with these results. Estimating the
linear regression of b = 
1
+
2
v+  yields estimates of
^

1
=  12:75 and
^

2
= :815, which
are both statistically signicant. Thus, after accounting for unusually low bids near zero
(the negative intercept), bidding appears to be slightly above the prediction of the risk
neutral Nash equilibrium (
2
= :8).
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5.1 Do bidders form cooperative agreements?
The results of Isaac and Walker (1985) suggest that successful cooperative is expected
here. A signicant drop in bidding prices is one indicator of collusive behavior. The av-
erage bid in periods with communication drops to near zero. While the average bid in no
communication periods was 428 francs, it was only 9.6 francs in communication periods.
However, a reduction in bid levels is not necessarily an indicator of protable collusive
behavior; Isaac et al. (1984) found that while prices increased when communication was
allowed in posted-oer markets, prots did not necessarily increase. Isaac and Walker
(1985) use an index of monopoly eectiveness (M), which is the proportion of maximum
24
However, there was signicant variation of prots across experiments due to the choice of cooperative
strategy.
25
The standard errors for the two coecients are 5.205 and .0087 respectively. The null hypothesis
that 
2
 :8 can be rejected at a 95% level of signicance.
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total possible surplus captured by the bidders:
M =
P
5
j=1
v

j
  b

j
P
5
j=1
max
i
v
ij
;
where v

j
is the valuation of the winning bidder in market j and b

j
is his bid. In these
experiments, M increases from an average of .265 in no communication periods to .912
when communication is allowed. Bidders capture a signicantly large proportion of the
total surplus available. Perhaps the strongest evidence of successful cooperative behavior
is that, despite a change in the conversion rate from 250 francs per dollar to 500 francs
per dollar, average bidder per period prots rose from $ .93 to $ 1.51.
1 Conclusion When communication is allowed, under both environments and informa-
tion conditions, collusive agreements are formed and are stable.
Few deviations from collusive agreements were evident in the ten experiments. In
early periods, bidders occasionally placed bids that were not in line with the collusive
agreement. Excluding the rst two periods of communication, there were only three out
of 129 periods in which bidders made notable deviations from the cooperative agreements.
In contrast to Isaac and Walker (1985), where collusion occasionally broke down, there
is no evidence of sustained deviations in these experiments.
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Given the apparent strength of collusive agreements, the two changes mentioned in
Section 4.5 were made to try to gain an insight into the source of the strength of these
ties. Under the EG treatment, 9 out of 10 subjects did not deviate from the collusive
agreement; only one bidder in experiment seven deviated.
27
This seems to indicate that
even in one shot environments such collusive agreements are fairly stable. Thus, repeated
play is not a particularly important factor in the success of cooperation in this setting.
However, a second change indicated weakness in collusive agreements. Three exper-
iments were conducted with the PC treatment. As expected, in all three experiments,
the bidders formulated an agreement on how to collude when discussion was not allowed.
However, bidders were quick to deviate from their ex ante agreements. In the rst period
of no communication, one bidder deviated in every experiment (see Figure 3). The num-
ber of deviations typically increased and most bidders began to bid more aggressively. In
one experiment, by the last period four of the ve bidders placed bids roughly in line with
competitive bidding. However, in the other two experiments, a few bidders were typically
able to take advantage of the optimistic behavior of the other bidders. All in all, 12 of 15
bidders placed bids that were signicantly dierent than the ex ante agreement reached
by the group. Bidder surplus as a percentage of maximum total surplus dropped from
87.88% in the communication periods to 80.64% in the no communication periods.
28
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The graphs of bidders' surplus in Appendix C demonstrate the consistency of the cooperative
agreements.
27
That bidder placed a bid out of line with the collusive agreement in only one market.
28
The null hypothesis that the mean surplus from the communication periods is less than or equal to
the mean surplus with communication can be rejected at a 90% level of condence by a rank sum test
26
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Figure 3: Bidders Deviating when No Communication was allowed
2 Conclusion Communication is more important than repeated play in fostering suc-
cessful collusive agreements.
These results indicate that one of the most important features of such collusive agree-
ments is the ability to discuss the outcomes and make after plans every period. A possible
explanation is the need for the cartel to coordinate punishment strategies at the end of
each period.
5.2 What types of strategies do bidders utilize?
Closer examination of the periods in which communication was allowed reveals hetero-
geniety in the choice of cooperative strategies between some experimental sessions. Two
distinct strategies can be discerned from the data and observation of preplay communi-
cation. The rst, and most common strategy, was the utilization of bid rotation. Bid
rotation strategies can be characterized by the selection of one bidder as the sole bidder
(z = 1:317).
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in each auction. This bidder placed a low bid greater than 1 franc (typically 2{5 francs)
while all other bidders bid 1 franc in the auction. A second strategy observed in the data
was a reduced bidding agreement. This strategy entails the agreement by all bidders to
place bids which are linear transformations of their actual valuations. Since bidders are
required to submit whole franc bids of at least 1 franc, reduced bidding will, in general,
lead to higher average bids than bid rotation.
29
3 Conclusion In 7 out of 10 experiments, bidders used a bid rotation strategy. In
experiments where bid rotation was not used, bidders used a reduced bidding strategy.
The easiest method for discerning these two dierent strategies was observation of preplay
communication. In the 7 experiments in which bid rotation was used, bidders attempted
to reach some resolution of who would bid in each market. However, in the 3 bid reduction
schemes, bidders determined a level of bidding. The dierence between these experiments
can also be seen in the level of bids placed. In the 7 rotation experiments, the average
bid placed was 2.8 francs. In the reduced bidding experiments, the average bid was 23
francs.
5.2.1 Reduced Bidding
In two of the reduced bidding experiments, the cartel agreed to place bids that were
1% of redemption values.
30
In the other, bidders agreed to place bids that were 10%
of valuations. Such agreements violate individual incentive compatibility (Section 3).
Only an agreement to bid 80% of valuations is incentive compatible. Since their values
are not ex post veriable, bidders can increase their bids beyond either the 1% or 10%
level without detection, and increase their probability of winning the object. Therefore,
bidders would be expected to bid higher than their particular reduced bidding agreement
dictates. Figure 4 shows the deviations from the agreed upon strategy. A deviation of
zero indicates that the bidder placed his bid at the whole number nearest either 1% (for
experiments 1 and 4) or 10% (for experiment 3) of his value. In all three experiments
the null hypothesis that the mean deviation is equal to zero can be rejected at the 95%
condence level. Surprisingly, however, in two of the experiments, mean deviations are
signicantly below zero implying bidders were actually bidding below the agreement.
Only in one experiment were deviations signicantly above zero (See Table 2).
The fact that these reduced bidding agreements are replicated and appear to be
relatively stable creates problems for the theory. Why did bidders not shade their bids
up in two experiments? Bidders seem to ignore individual incentives, despite the fact
that detection of placing higher bids is very dicult.
29
Bid rotation strategies lead to average bids that are close to 1 franc since all bidders except one bid
1 franc.
30
Bidders in experiment 4 quickly switched from a 10% rule to a 1% rule after two periods.
28
Experiment 3 (10%)
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
ev
ia
tio
n
Experiment 4 (1%)
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
ev
ia
tio
n
Experiment 1 (1%)
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
ev
ia
tio
n
Figure 4: Deviations from Reduced Bidding Agreements
Experiment
1 3 4
Mean Deviation -0.06481 -0.00774 0.167219
Std. Error 0.131955 0.076929 0.286164
Observations 375 425 425
Table 2: Mean Deviations from Reduced Bidding Agreement
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5.2.2 Bid Rotation
The majority of the experiment sessions (7 out of 10) lead to bidding strategies that were
classied as bid rotation agreements. There are many dierent mechanisms which are
incentive compatible and look like bid rotation outcomes. The choice of mechanism by
the group has signicant implications for eciency and thus the percentage of maximum
total surplus captured by the bidders. Four behavioral strategies which can lead to
outcomes similar to those observed in these seven experiments are:
1. Ranking mechanism (R),
2. Serial dictator mechanism (SD),
3. Random assignment mechanism (A), and
4. Perfect information (P).
The ranking (R), serial dictator (SD), and random assignment (A) mechanisms were dis-
cussed in Section 3. The perfect information (P) strategy describes the possibility that
bidders may perfectly collude by somehow determining the bidder with the highest valu-
ation in each market.
31
The objective is to determine which of these possible mechanisms
was most likely utilized in each of these experiments. Three techniques that shed light
on the choice of a strategy by bidders are:
1. Observation of preplay discussion,
2. Comparison of expected eciencies with observed eciencies, and
3. Comparison of predicted market division with observed choices.
 Discussion
While observing bidder discussion is not a rigorous test for the predominance of one
model over the other, simply listening to the conversations of the bidders can provide a
great deal of insight into the intentions of the bidders. Bidder discussion was typically
closer to the ranking mechanism than to the serial dictator mechanism. In most cases,
bidders would begin their discussion by naming what they wanted rst (their highest
rank). If there was no conict, discussion ended. If there was disagreement, those who
had chosen conicting markets would attempt to reach a compromise by naming their
next best market. It is easy to see that such an iterative procedure leads to outcomes
predicted by the ranking mechanism under the restriction that no bidder be chosen more
than once. If the group discussion was consistent with the serial dictator mechanism,
once a bidder had named a market in which he wished to bid, no other bidder could pick
that market. Typically, conversation between bidders did not take this form.
32
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This is a highly unexpected outcome given the limitations on bidder communications. However, it
is still possible that this may be the best predictor of group behavior.
32
However, it is possible that there may have been some rst-mover advantage; the bidder who made
his announcement of preferred markets rst got his favored market more often. Since the order of
discussion was not recorded, this factor cannot be analyzed for these experiments.
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Behavioral Predicted Eciency
Strategy Symmetry Asymmetry
R 90.60% 92.12%
SD 85.20% 86.63%
A 60.00% 80.00%
P 100.0% 100.0%
Table 3: Predicted Eciencies
Experiment
2 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean Eciency 90.52% 92.70% 90.48% 92.77% 87.94% 89.94% 90.69%
Std. Error 0.0466 0.0545 0.0985 0.0755 0.1100 0.0729 0.0841
Observations 17 15 15 15 13 13 12
Table 4: Mean Eciencies { Rotation
 Eciencies
An auction is ecient if the winner of each object is the bidder with the highest
valuation. Eciency is denoted by
Eciency =
P
5
j=1
v

j
P
5
j=1
max
i
v
ij
:
The predicted eciencies for each of the behavioral strategies in this particular setting
are given in Table 3. If a group is utilizing a particular mechanism, the average of the
observed eciencies should converge to the above eciencies. The null hypothesis that
the mean eciency for each experiment was dierent than 90.60%, for the symmetric
environment, and 92.12%, for the asymmetric environment, predicted by the ranking
mechanism cannot be rejected at a 95% level of condence in any of the seven experiments
(See Table 4). However, in ve of the seven experiments, the null hypothesis that the
mean eciency was equal to that predicted by the serial dictator mechanism ( 85.20% and
86.63%) can be rejected at a 95% level of condence.
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The observed eciencies are also
signicantly dierent from the 60% and 80% predicted by an assignment mechanism. The
perfect information model can also be rejected under this test in all seven experiments.
A simple comparison of observed results seems to strongly favor the ranking mechanism
as the best determinant of behavior in each of the seven experiments.
 Comparing the Choices
An analysis of bidder discussion and eciencies provides some support for the rank-
ing mechanism. However, analysis of discussion is purely ad hoc and relies upon the
judgement of the experimenter who observed the experimental session. Comparison of
mean observations utilizes outcomes rather than choices.
33
Comparison of the mean bidder surplus yields similar results since bids placed are close to zero.
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A more rigorous test involves comparing the choices of the bidders to the choices
predicted by each model. Initial examination of choices in each particular experiment
indicates that the ranking mechanism is a good predictor of choices; 87% of all observed
choices are consistent with the ranking mechanism. However, other mechanisms also
correlate well with the observed choices. The likelihood-based classication procedure
of El-Gamal and Grether (1995) provides a more rigorous statistical comparison of all
the proposed models. Let C
t
= f(c
1
; c
2
; c
3
; c
4
; c
5
)j c
i
2 Z; 1  c
i
 5; i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g
be the class of behavior rules for each period such that each bidder is selected as the
sole bidder in a particular market. For example, c
1
= 2 indicates that bidder 2 was
selected as the sole bidder in market A. Each model predicts a subset B
t
 C
t
and
B = B
1
B
2
    B
p
s
where p
s
is the number of periods completed in an experiment.
Each experimental session is treated as a single subject, s, and it is assumed that each
s chooses exactly one behavioral strategy. The error probability, , is assumed to be the
same for all individuals, experimental sessions and choices. The choice by individual i in
period t for a particular experimental session is denoted by a
ti
. Then, for all B, let
x
s
B;ti
=

1 a
ti
2 B
t
0 otherwise:
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be the total number of choices predicted correctly for a particular session. The likelihood
can be found to be
f
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for each behavioral strategy.
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Under the assumption that participants in all S experi-
ments are using the same mechanism, the maximum likelihood estimate is given by
(
^
B; ^) = argmax
B;
S
Y
s=1
f
B;
(x
s
):
The algorithm suggested by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) is used to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimate for any set of k behavioral strategies. Then, using a penalty function
given by
g(k) = k ln(4) + k ln(3) + S ln(k);
k is chosen to maximize the information criterion,
IC(k) = ln
 
S
Y
s=1
max
h2f1;:::;kg
f
^
B;^
(x
s
)
!
  g(k):
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It is assumed here that, if a bidder made an error, he chose the correct strategy with probability
one third and another strategy with probability two thirds. In reality, a bidder could have a choice of
between 5 (if he happens to be choosing rst or if there is little conict) to 1 (if he is choosing last or
there is a great deal of conict) markets. Since, on average, he will have a choice of three markets, (
1
3
;
2
3
)
is selected as an approximation.
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Experiment
2 5 6 7 8 9 10
R 85.88% 90.67% 85.33% 93.33% 78.46% 89.23% 85.00%
SD 84.71% 65.33% 62.67% 64.00% 86.15% 86.15% 86.67%
A 29.41% 49.33% 40.00% 42.67% 33.85% 23.08% 30.00%
P 56.47% 58.67% 61.33% 60.00% 50.77% 53.85% 60.00%
Table 5: Percentage of Choices Explained by Models { Individual Experiments
Using this technique, I can test the ability of the four possible mechanisms to explain the
observed choices by each experimental session. The choices of the ranking mechanism
(R) are easily characterized by saying that an error was made in a particular market
if the bidder chosen was not the individual with the highest rank in that market. Un-
fortunately, the serial dictator mechanism (SD) cannot be characterized as easily. Each
possible permutation of the ve bidders can potentially lead to a dierent choice of market
assignment predicted by the mechanism. Almost any observed choice can be predicted
by the mechanism. For any particular experiment the number of possible combinations
of choices across periods is 120
p
s
(which is 8:92 10
24
in the experiment with the fewest
periods). The choices predicted by the serial dictator mechanism are limited to a smaller
set. It is assumed that each experimental group agrees to rotate the order of selection
in each period. Thus, if the order of choosing was 1,2,3,4,5 in period t then it would be
2,3,4,5,1 in period t+ 1. This limits the number of combinations predicted by the serial
dictator mechanism to a more manageable 120 combinations. While limiting the serial
dictator mechanism in this manner makes it less likely that it will be classied as the
best tting model, it is reasonable to assume that no individual bidder would approve
of any combination that did not evenly spread out the right to pick early since early
picking leads to higher individual surplus. The assignment mechanism (A) assumes that
each bidder is selected as the sole bidder in his favored market when distributions are not
symmetric. Thus, bidder 1 is assumed to always be the sole bidder in market A, bidder
2 in B, bidder 3 in C, bidder 4 in D, and bidder 5 in E. Finally, the perfect information
model (P) represents the choices that would be made if the bidders were able to actually
aggregate their information perfectly. The bidder with the highest value is picked in each
market.
Table 5 presents the data for each experiment. In all experiments, the ranking and
serial dictator mechanisms better explain the data than either assignment or perfect
information. Table 6 reports the results of the maximization of the information criterion
to determine the optimal number of rules to choose. Using two rules best explains the
choices observed in the seven experiments. In experiments 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9, the ranking
mechanism is the behavioral strategy that best ts the experimental data. However, the
serial dictator mechanism signicantly adds to the explanatory power of the model in
experiments 8 and 10. Using this classication procedure, it is possible to rule out the
random assignment model of collusive behavior. Also, bidders were apparently unable
to perfectly aggregate information. However, the serial dictator mechanism can not be
eliminated.
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No. of Models Rule(s) Chosen No. Classied ^ g(k) IC
1 R 435 0.39 2.485 -203.101
2 R,SD 333,108 0.354 9.822 -197.893
3 R,SD,* 333,108,0 0.354 15.145 -203.216
4 R,SD,*,* 333,108,0,0 0.354 19.644 -207.715
Table 6: Estimated Models
Information
Limited Zero
3 Reduced
Symmetric 2 Rotation
Values 1 Rotation
Asymmetric 2 Rotation 2 Rotation
Table 7: The Eect of Treatments
The combination of these three methods of determining which bid rotation scheme
was used gives strong evidence in favor of the ranking mechanism. The serial dictator
mechanism, however, still appears to be a strategy which is used occasionally by groups
in this setting, especially in experiment 8, in which both the observed eciency and the
choices of markets correlate well with the serial dictator mechanism.
4 Conclusion Reduced bidding mechanisms are only observed under the limited infor-
mation and symmetric environments.
All three instances of utilization of reduced bidding strategies were in experiments in
which bidders had uniform valuation draws in all ve markets and were informed of
the identity of the winning bidders (Table 7). While Isaac and Walker (1985) found no
signicant patterns between collusive agreements and their two information conditions
of full information and limited information,
35
this result demonstrates that information
matters. While it may not be signicant in determining whether bidders collude, it
does alter their choice of strategy. Bidders seem to be less willing to select a strategy
which violates incentive constraints when they have less ex post information. Second, the
switch to a less cooperative strategy in the asymmetric environment has some precedence.
Isaac and Walker (1988) found that asymmetries in public goods experiments tended to
decrease the level of voluntary contributions. While a complete breakdown of cooperation
is never evident here, this result suggests that bidders' choice of strategies is aected by
the environment.
35
The full information condition was a less restrictive environment which reported all the bids placed
in the auction.
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5.3 What eect do dierent strategies have on the outcome of
the auction?
The choice of cooperative strategies can drastically eect the results of the auction.
The dierences between mechanisms can best be seen by examining the eciency of the
auction and the amount of surplus accruing to the bidders.
5.3.1 Eciency
Despite the apparent problems with enforceability, reduced bidding agreements have
advantages from a social welfare standpoint. In the three experiments which exhibited
these collusive agreements, average eciencies were 99.26%, 99.38%, and 98.36%. A rank
sum test shows that the mean eciency for these experiments is signicantly dierent
than the mean eciency of experiments in which bidders used rotation schemes.
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5 Conclusion Reduced bidding yields higher average eciency than bid rotation.
This result is due to the ability of reduced bidding to select the highest bidder (assuming
people do not deviate from the agreement). Figure 5 shows the eciencies for the exper-
iments in which reduced bidding was observed and the eciencies for the experiments
in which bid rotation was observed. Eciency is also fairly stable under the reduced
bidding agreements. When bidders are using rotation schemes, eciency varies signif-
icantly due to the imprecision of the ranks. However, the reduced bidding agreement
consistently yields eciencies near 100%. The variance of the observed eciencies for
the seven non-reduced bidding experiments was always higher than the variance for the
three reduced bidding experiments.
5.3.2 Bidder Surplus
The overall level of protability for the bidders is best described by the index of monopoly
eectiveness which reports the proportion of total possible surplus captured by the bid-
ders. In experiments in which bidders used rotation schemes or the 10% reduced bidding
agreement, the average M was 0.898, whereas the two 1% reduced bidding experiments
yielded an average eectiveness of 0.970.
6 Conclusion The index of monopoly eectiveness is highest for the bidders under the
1% reduced bidding rule.
The 1% reduced bidding agreement was the most successful (protable) collusive agree-
ment. This result highlights the apparent trade-os between these strategies. If bidders
36
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with correction for ties yielded z = 8:267, which is greater than
any reasonable critical value of the standard normal distribution.
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Figure 5: Reduced Bidding v. Rotation Eciencies
do not lie about their values, reduced bidding yields a much higher eciency than rota-
tion schemes. This increase in the size of the available surplus more than accounts for
the increased level of bids required by a 1% agreement. The 10% agreement, on the other
hand, entails too high a level of bidding to actually increase protability over rotation
schemes.
These two conclusions are the best argument in favor of a reduced bidding mechanism.
Bidders select reduced bidding because it is more protable than rotation mechanisms,
despite the fact that it is not consistent with individual incentives. It appears that
something in the nature of communication in the group decision making process allowed
the bidders to ignore this problem.
6 Conclusion
The two primary contributions of this paper are:
1. A description of possible collusive mechanisms when the number of objects is greater
than 1,
2. An analysis of experimental data to identify the strategies chosen by bidders.
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While incentive compatibility constraints severely limit the set of possible cooperative
strategies in single unit auctions, there are many more sophisticated and protable pos-
sible mechanisms when multiple objects are being auctioned simultaneously. Rotation
schemes take advantage of bidders' willingness to trade-o probability of winning in lesser
valued markets in return for an increased probability in higher valued markets. Of all
rotation schemes that use only ordinal information, the ranking mechanism is interim in-
centive ecient and provides outcomes strictly preferred to those that are possible when
only one item is being auctioned (random assignment).
Previous experimental investigations of cooperation in a wide variety of settings (auc-
tions, markets, public goods, prisoners' dilemma) have almost solely focused on the for-
mation of cooperative agreements. It has been well established that, in environments
similar to the auction environment discussed here, experimental subjects will agree to
cooperate. In this paper, I examine the choice of cooperative strategies. Bidders can
choose from a variety of strategies (including noncooperative behavior) that vary signi-
cantly in their complexity, protability, and adherence to incentive constraints. Subjects
exhibit behavior which is often consistent with strategies predicted by theory.
However, deviations in three of the experimental sessions from the choices predicted
by theory suggest that a better theory of the cooperative choice of a decision rule needs
to be formulated. In these experiments, bidders used a strategy that is not incentive
compatible, but leads to higher prots when bidders do not lier about their values. The
theory developed here assumes that bidders do not voluntarily communicate and that
any information that is used must be consistent with their incentives. However, if, a
priori, bidders could agree to credibly reveal their information, then reduced bidding
agreements become possible. A complete theory of the choice of strategies when bidders
are asymmetrically informed will treat the level of communication as an additional choice
variable. Wilson (1978) proposes versions of interim eciency that assume dierent levels
of information sharing (coarse and ne). Interim eciency is a very weak standard on
the strategies chosen. Potentially, there are many interim ecient mechanisms. Since the
behavior being modeled is explicitly cooperative, a more cooperative solution concept is
in order. In many domains that concept is the core. However, nding core allocations in
this setting is more dicult. For example, the feasible set of strategies for each coalition
depends upon the actions of those outside the coalition, and the question of information
sharing within coalitions becomes relevant. Myerson (1984) provides some initial insights
by dening threat points as minimal levels of expected utility that each coalition must
receive.
The inclusion of durability may also lead to a more satisfying theory. If a mechanism
is not durable, then there will be instances in which bidders will reject it in favor of an-
other mechanism. This behavior might be observable experimentally. Is there evidence
of a move away from one mechanism based upon the values drawn? In terms of collu-
sion, durability might even predict when collusion breaks down. Unfortunately, in this
experimental design, the random assignment, serial dictator, and ranking mechanisms
dominate the noncooperative mechanism (due to the choice of distributions).
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Finally, the auctioneer was assumed to be completely passive. In reality, the auction-
eer can take steps to combat collusive behavior. Graham and Marshall (1987) highlight
some techniques that the auctioneer may use in an English auction. In sealed bid auc-
tions, the use of a reserve price becomes even more important for the auctioneer to earn
revenue. Collusive strategies are also easily identiable by a lack of bidding. If the auc-
tioneer can punish collusive behavior, then bidders may need to formulate agreements
that are less obvious. A full understanding of collusion in auctions requires an analysis
of the steps an auctioneer can take to combat collusion.
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Rearranging and bringing the  inside the sum yields the desired result
m
X
j=1
(Q
ij
(v
i
) + (1  )Q
0
ij
(v
i
))v
ij
  (T
ij
(v
i
) + (1  )T
0
ij
(v
i
)) 
m
X
j=1
(Q
ij
(v
i
) + (1  )Q
0
ij
(v
i
))v
ij
)  (T
ij
(v
i
) + (1  )T
0
ij
(v
i
)) (12)
Feasibility follows by simply allowing each agent to report their types v
i
and using a public
randomization device to choose (Q; T ) with probability  and (Q
0
; T
0
) with probability
(1  ).
A.2 Lemma If F
ij
= F
kj
for all i; j; k and (Q; T ) = f(Q
i
; T
i
)g
n
i=1
is feasible and
! =
n
X
i=1
1
n
Z
((v
i
)(Q
i
(v
i
)v
i
  T
i
(v
i
)))dF
i
(v
i
)
where  is a social welfare weight on types, Q
i
and T
i
are j1 vectors and F
i
is the joint
distribution of the j values of each agent. Then 9(
^
Q;
^
T ) such that
^
Q
i
=
^
Q
k
and
^
T
i
=
^
T
k
for all i; k and
Z
((v)
^
Q(v)v  
^
T (v))dF (v) = !
Also, if (Q; T ) is IC then (
^
Q;
^
T ) is IC as well.
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Proof : Since values for all individuals are drawn from identical distributions and utilities
are of an identical form, if (Q; T ) is feasible and IC then for all  : f1; : : : ; ng ! f1; : : : ; ng
one-to-one (permutations) fQ
(i)
; T
(i)
g
n
i=1
is also feasible and IC. By Lemma A.1, every
mechanism in the convex hull of all permutations of (Q; T ) is feasible and IC. Let (
^
Q;
^
T ) be
the mechanism created by the convex combination of all n! permutations of (Q; T ) equally
weighted by
1
n!
. Thus, since each (Q
i
; T
i
) appears exactly (n  1)! times,
^
Q =
1
n
P
n
i=1
Q
i
and
^
T =
1
n
P
n
i=1
T
i
. Thus, given , we have that
Z
((v)(
^
Q(v)v  
^
T (v)))dF (v) =
Z
((v)(
1
n
n
X
i=1
Q
i
(v)v  
1
n
n
X
i=1
T
i
(v)))dF (v)
=
n
X
i=1
1
n
Z
((v)(Q
i
(v)v   T
i
(v)))dF
i
(v)
= ! (13)
Thus, (
^
Q;
^
T ) is symmetric, feasible and IC and leads to the same ex ante social value.
proof of Lemma 3.5: Let the Reduced Bidding mechanism be IC. Then given the rst
order conditions for maximization of each agent's expected utility, it must be that
g
ij
(v
ij
)v
ij
(1  
j
) G
ij
(v
ij
)
j
= 0 (14)
 
ij
(v
ij
) = v
ij
(1  
j
)

j
(15)
Since this must be true for all v
ij
2 [v; v], dierentiating with respect to v
ij
yields
d 
ij
(v
ij
)
dv
ij
=
1  
j

j
= c
j
Obviously, the other direction can be trivially shown to hold by setting 
j
=
1
d 
ij
(v
ij
)
dv
ij
+1
.
Proof of Theorem 3.6: Let (; s) be a reduced bidding mechanism satisfying incentive
compatibility (and thus the conditions of Lemma 3.5). Suppose that b
ij
(v
ij
) = 
j
v
ij
is
not a Bayes Nash equilibrium. In the noncooperative setting the rst order conditions
for maximization are given by Equation ??. If b
ij
(v
ij
) = 
j
v
ij
is not an equilibrium then
it must be that
1
v
ij
  
j
v
ij
6=
X
k 6=i
H
kj
(v
ij
)

1

j

for some i and j where
H
kj
(v) =
f
kj
(v)
F
kj
(v)
which implies that

j
6= v
ij
(1  
j
)
X
k 6=i
H
kj
(v
ij
)
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Note that
g
ij
(v
ij
) = G
ij
(v
ij
)
X
k 6=i
H
kj
(v
ij
)
Thus, multiplying by G
ij
(v
ij
) > 0 leads to
G
ij
(v
ij
)
j
6= v
ij
(1  
j
)g
ij
(v
ij
)
which is a contradiction with the rst order conditions for IC given by Equation 14. Thus,
if the reduced bidding mechanism is IC it is also the outcome of competitive behavior.
Proof of Theorem 3.9: Let (; s) be an incentive compatible mechanism. Dene
Q
ij
(v
i
) = G
ij
(B
ij
(v
i
))
and
T
ij
(v
i
) = G
ij
(B
ij
(v
i
))(B
ij
(v
i
)  v) + S
ij
(v
i
):
Then,
m
X
j=1
Q
ij
(v
i
)(v
ij
  v)  T
ij
(v
i
) 
m
X
j=1
Q
ij
(B
ij
(v
i
))(v
ij
  B
ij
(v
i
))  S
ij
(v
i
) 8v
i
8i:
Since, (; s) satises that necessary and sucient conditions for IC then so to must (q; t).
To show the second part assume that S(v) =
P
n
i=1
P
m
j=1
S
ij
(v
i
) and note that T (v) =
P
n
i=1
P
m
j=1
G
ij
(B
ij
(v
i
))(B
ij
(v
i
)   v) + S
ij
(v
i
). Thus, since G
ij
(B
ij
(v
i
)) is a probability
and (B
ij
(v
i
)   v)  0 (v is the lower bound of the range of B
ij
(v
i
)), it must be that
T (v)  S(v) for all v. Thus, we can dene a function c
ij
(v
 i
) such that c
ij
(v
 i
)  0 and
P
n
i=1
P
m
j=1
c
ij
(v
 i
) = T (v)  S(v). Let
c
ij
(v
 i
) =
P
m
k 6=i
G
kj
(B
kj
(v
k
))(B
kj
(v
k
)  v)
n  1
Then, let
^
T
ij
(v
i
) = T
ij
(v
ij
) 
Z
v
v
c
ij
(v
 i
)dF
 i
be the new expected tax then (q;
^
t) is a new mechanism that is still incentive compatible
(since the new term is just a constant for any agent) but yields higher expected utility
due to the lower expected taxes.
Proof of Theorem 3.17: Suppose q is an ex post ecient Bayesian Mechanism without
transfers. Let v
i
= (v
i1
; v
i2
; : : : ; v
im
) and v^
i
= (v
ij
; v^
i; j
) and agent i is as given above.
Incentive Compatibility requires that
U
i
(v^
i
; v^
i
)  U
i
(v
i
; v^
i
) and U
i
(v
i
; v
i
)  U
i
(v^
i
; v
i
):
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Thus,
m
X
j=1
Z
v^
ij
q
ij
(v^
i
; v
 i
)dF
 i
(v
 i
) 
m
X
j=1
Z
v^
ij
q
ij
(v
i
; v
 i
)dF
 i
(v
 i
)
and
m
X
j=1
Z
v
ij
q
ij
(v
i
; v
 i
)dF
 i
(v
 i
) 
m
X
j=1
Z
v
ij
q
ij
(v^
i
; v
 i
)dF
 i
(v
 i
):
Since q
ij
(v) = 1 only if v
ij
> v
kj
for all k 6= i and q
ij
(v) = 0 otherwise, from ex post
eciency, I may simplify, so that
R
q
ij
(v
i
; v
 i
)dF
 i
(v
 i
) = G
ij
(v
ij
). Thus,
m
X
j=1
v^
ij
G
ij
(v^
ij
) 
m
X
j=1
v^
ij
G
ij
(v
ij
)
and
m
X
j=1
v
ij
G
ij
(v
ij
) 
m
X
j=1
v
ij
G
ij
(v^
ij
)
But for all k 6= j v
ik
= v^
ik
implying that G
ik
(v
ik
) = G
ik
(v^
ik
). This allows me to simplify
the expression to
v^
ij
G
ij
(v^
ij
)  v^
ij
G
ij
(v
ij
)
and
v
ij
G
ij
(v
ij
)  v
ij
G
ij
(v^
ij
):
Rearranging terms yields
v^
ij
[G
ij
(v^
ij
) G
ij
(v
ij
)]  0
and
v
ij
[G
ij
(v
ij
) G
ij
(v^
ij
)]  0:
Since both v^
ij
; v
ij
> 0, it must be that G
ij
(v^
ij
) = G
ij
(v
ij
), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.19: Since the probabilities dened by the random assignment mech-
anism and the optimal bid function are independent for each market. If suces to show
that the result holds for one j. Let v
ij
< v be a value for bidder i in market j. If the
noncooperative outcome is preferred then it must be that
(v
ij
  b
ij
(v
ij
))F
j
(v
ij
)
n 1
>
1
n
v
ij
(16)
which implies that
v
ij
F
j
(v
ij
)
n 1
>
1
n
v
ij
and
nF
j
(v
ij
)
n 1
> 1:
Since F
j
(v
ij
) < 1, then lim
n!1
nF
j
(v
ij
)
n 1
= 0. Thus, for some n, random assignment
must be preferred at v
ij
< v. As n!1, the set of v
ij
such that (16) holds converges to
v a set of measure zero.
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In order to prove Proposition 3.22, we need the following lemma.
A.3 Lemma Let ; 
0
2 R
n
+
and
P
n
i=1

i
=
P
n
i=1

0
i
= 1. If there exists a k such
that for all j  k, 
j
 
0
j
and for all j > k, 
j
 
0
j
, then for all x 2 R
n
such that
x
1
 x
2
     x
n
,   x  
0
 x.
Proof : Assume 9x 3   x < 
0
 x. Then it must be that
(
1
  
0
1
)x
1
+ (
2
  
0
2
)x
2
+   + (
n
  
0
n
)x
n
< 0
Since for all j  k; (
j
  
0
j
)  0 and for all j > k; (
j
  
0
j
)  0
 
X
jk

j
 
X
jk

0
j
!
x
k
+
 
X
j>k

j
 
X
j>k

0
j
!
x
k+1
< 0
Since  and 
0
both sum to 1, we can simplify to get
 
X
jk

j
 
X
jk

0
j
!
x
k
<
 
X
jk

j
 
X
jk

0
j
!
x
k+1
which implies the contradiction that x
k
< x
k+1
.
Proof of Proposition 3.22: Let Q
SD
ij
be the reduced form probabilities given by the serial
dictator mechanism, and let Q
A
ij
=
1
n
. Note that
P
m
j=1
Q
SD
ij
=
P
m
j=1
Q
A
ij
=
m
n
. Also, note
that Q
SD
ij
is a decreasing function of each markets ordinal ranking. Thus, w.l.o.g. let v
i
be such that v
i1
 v
i2
    v
im
. Note that Q
SD
i1
> Q
A
i1
=
1
n
since with probability
1
n
, i
gets to choose rst, however, there is also a positive probability that i chooses at some
other point but market 1 is still available. This is enough to apply Lemma A.3 (multiply
the whole equation by
n
m
in order to get a linear combination). Thus, it must be that for
all v
i
; v
i
Q
SD
ij
 v
i
Q
A
ij
. All that remains to be shown is that 9v
i
3 v
i
Q
SD
ij
> v
i
Q
A
ij
Let v
i
= (v
i1
; : : : ; v
ik
; v
i(k+1)
; : : : ; v
im
). This yields our result.
Proof of Proposition 3.24: ()) Let an ordinal mechanism be IC and assume that 1 or 2
don't hold. Suppose 9l < p and a j such that Q
ij
(m
ij
= p) > Q
ij
(m
ij
= l). Let v
i
be
such that v
i1
> v
i2
>    > v
im
such that #fv
ik
jv
ik
> v
ij
g = l   1. IC implies that
Q
ij
(m
i1
= 1)v
i1
+   Q
ij
(m
ij
= l)v
ij
+   +Q
ik
(m
ik
= p)v
ik
+   +Q
im
(m
im
= m)v
im
 (17)
Q
ij
(m
i1
= 1)v
i1
+   +Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)v
ij
+   +Q
ik
(m
ik
= l)v
ik
+   +Q
im
(m
im
= m)v
im
(18)
which implies that
Q
ij
(m
ij
= l)v
ij
+Q
ik
(m
ik
= p)v
ik
 Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)v
ij
+Q
ik
(m
ik
= l)v
ik
(19)
v
ij
(Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p))  v
ik
(Q
ik
(m
ik
= l) Q
ik
(m
ik
= l)) (20)
given our assumptions, this implies that v
ij
 v
ik
which is a contradiction.
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Suppose 9Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p) 6= Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p). W.l.o.g. assume
Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p) > Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p). Let c =
Q
ij
(m
ij
=l) Q
ij
(m
ij
=p)
Q
ij
(m
ij
=l) Q
ij
(m
ij
=p)

1. Then chose v
i
such that #fv
il
jv
il
> v
ij
g = l   1 and #fv
il
jv
il
> v
ik
g = p   1 and
v
ik
< cv
ij
. Then, using the same argument as above, IC implies that
Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)
Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)

v
ik
v
ij
(21)
>
cv
ij
v
ij
(22)
= c (23)
which is a contradiction.
(() Suppose 1 and 2 hold but the ordinal mechanism is not IC. Then 9j; k 3 v
ij
> v
ik
and
Q
ij
(m
i1
= 1)v
i1
+   Q
ij
(m
ij
= l)v
ij
+   +Q
ik
(m
ik
= p)v
ik
+   +Q
im
(m
im
= m)v
im
< (24)
Q
ij
(m
i1
= 1)v
i1
+   +Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)v
ij
+   +Q
ik
(m
ik
= l)v
ik
+   +Q
im
(m
im
= m)v
im
(25)
which implies that
v
ij
(Q
ij
(m
ij
= l) Q
ij
(m
ij
= p)) < v
ik
(Q
ik
(m
ik
= l) Q
ik
(m
ik
= p))
given that 1,2 hold it must be that v
ij
< v
ik
which is a contradiction.
Before showing the proof that the ranking mechanism is interim incentive ecient,
some additional notation is in order. Since the ranking mechanism is assumed to be
anonymous, it must be that q
ij
(m) is a function only of the number of individuals
who have ranked each particular market in each spot. Thus, for simplicity let E
j
=
f(n
1j
; n
2j
; : : : ; n
mj
)j
P
m
i=1
n
ij
= ng be the set of possible total ranks for a market where
n
ij
indicates that n
ij
bidders ranked market j in their ith spot. Thus, E = E
1
E
2
  E
m
is the set of possible events over which q
ij
may vary. Let (e) be the probability that
e 2 E occurs.
Proof of Theorem 3.26: Suppose that there exists another ordinal mechanism such that
P
m
j=1
Q
0
ij
(v
i
)v
ij

P
m
j=1
Q
ij
(v
i
)v
ij
for all i and for all v
i
Let v
i
be such that v
i1
 v
i2
   
v
im
. Then it must be that
Q
0
i1
(1)v
i1
+Q
0
i2
(2)v
i2
: : :+Q
0
im
(m)v
im
 Q(1)v
i1
+Q(2)v
i2
: : :+Q(m)v
im
which implies that
(Q
0
i1
(1) Q(1))v
i1
+ (Q
0
i2
(2) Q(2))v
i2
: : :+ (Q
0
im
(m) Q(m))v
im
 0
This inequality implies that 9k 3 Q
0
ik
(k)  Q(k). If for all k  m; Q
0
ik
(k) = Q(k) then
for all i the outcome of Q
0
is identical to Q and they are equivalent mechanisms. On the
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other hand, let j be the rst market such that Q
0
ij
(j) > Q(j) Notice that,
Q
0
ij
(j) =
X
e2E(j)
q
0
ij
(e)(e) (26)
Q(j) =
X
e2E(j)
q
ij
(e)(e) (27)
where E(j) = fe 2 Ejn
jj
 1g. Let E(j) be partitioned into two sets: E(j)
1
= fe 2
E(j)jq
ij
(e) = 0g and E(j)
2
= fe 2 E(j)jq
ij
(e) > 0g. In order for Q
0
ij
(j) > Q(j) it must
be that 9e 2 E 3 q
0
ij
(e) > q
ij
. Now, show, by cases, that an increase in q
ij
for any event
in either E(j)
1
or E(j)
2
will lead to a contradiction.
Case 1: Suppose 9e 2 E(j)
1
3 q
0
ij
(e) > q
ij
(e).
Let c = q
0
ij
(e) Then, since q
ij
(e) = 0 it must be that 9k < j 3 n
kj
> 0 or some
other individual ranks the events lower than you. Let k

= minfkjn
k
> 0g. Under the
ranking mechanism, it must be that q
ik

(e) =
1
n
k

and q
il
(e) = 0 otherwise. Thus, since
q
ij
(e)  0 for all j and n
i
q
ik
= 1 it must be that any change increase in q
0
ij
(e) must come
at a reduction in q
ik
. Thus it must be that q
0
ik
=
1 n
j
c
n
k
. Thus given the choice of j, it
must be that

1  n
j
c
n
k
 
1
n
k

(e)v
ik
+ [c(e)]v
ij
 0
which is true only if
v
ij

n
j
n
k
v
ik
Notice that both n
j
and n
k
are greater than zero. This is only true for all e 2 E(j)
1
if
v
ij

1
n  1
v
ik
Let v
i
be such that v
i1
= v
i2
= : : : = v
i(j 1)
= v and v
ij
= v
i(j+1)
= : : : = v
im
= v. If q
0
is
preferred to q it must be that v 
1
n 1
v. Since v > (n  1)v, it must be that v > v which
is a contradiction. Thus, Case 1 cannot hold.
Case 2: Suppose 9e 2 E(j)
2
3 q
0
ij
(e) > q
ij
(e). If e 2 E(j)
2
, then it must be that
q
ij
(e) =
1
n
j
. Thus, it must be that q
0
ij
(e) >
1
n
j
which violates feasibility of anonymous
mechanisms (since this implies q
0
kj
(e) 6= q
0
ij
(e) for some other individual who ranks the
market in spot j. Thus, Case 2 cannot hold.
Thus, there cannot exist a q
0
such that it improves each agent's interim expected
utility for all values.
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Appendix B Experiment Instructions
Experiment Instructions
Introduction
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of market decision making
in which you will earn money based on the decisions you make. All earnings you make are yours
to keep and will be paid to you at the end of the experiment. In this experiment you are going to
participate in a market in which you will be buying units in a sequence of independent market
days or trading periods. You will each receive a sequence of numbers, ve for each period,
which describe the value to you of any decisions you might make. These numbers may dier
among individuals.You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private
information. From this point forward, you will be referred to by your bidder number. You are
bidder number in this experiment. In each trading period you will be able to place bids to
purchase a single unit in all of ve markets (labeled A-E).
Redemption Values and Earnings
During each market period you are free to purchase a unit in any of the ve markets if you
want. If you purchase a unit in that market, you will receive the redemption value indicated
on your redemption value sheet for that period and that market. Your earnings from a unit
purchase, which are yours to keep, are the dierence between your redemption value for that
unit and the price you paid for the unit. That is:
Your earnings = (redemption value) - (purchase price)
Suppose for example that you buy a unit in market A and that your redemption value is 200
in market A. If you pay 150 for the unit then your earnings are
Earnings from unit = 200 - 150 = 50
You can calculate your earnings on your accounting sheet at the end of each period. The
currency used in the markets is francs. The conversion rate of francs to dollars will be listed on
your redemption value sheets. Your total earnings in any period are given by the sum of your
earnings in each market. For example, if you purchased a unit in market A for earnings of 50
and a unit in market B for earnings of 80, then your total earnings that period would be 130
francs. Remember, if you purchase a unit in a particular market, you must use the redemption
value from that market.
Market Organization
In each period ve markets will be open. There will be 5 participants in each market. In the
markets, buyers may submit bids by entering bids into the computer. The bids will be arranged
from the highest bid to the lowest. The highest bid in each market will be announced by the
computer as the buyer in that market. The identity of the highest bidder will not be announced.
The buyer will pay a price equal to the bid and as a result will earn the dierence between
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his/her redemption value for the unit and the highest bid placed. The bids of all other bidders
are nullied. They receive no redemption value and pay nothing and so have earnings of zero
for that market. If more than one bidder submits an identical high bid in a market, the buyer
will be determined randomly (each tied bidder has an equal chance) and the price paid will be
equal to their high bid in that market.
Submitting Bids
On your screen you will see a window titled, Make A Bid. In this window you select the market
you want to bid in by clicking the square beneath an item's letter. When you click on a market
the button will appear to be depressed in order to indicate that the market has been selected.
Once you mark the desired market, you can enter the amount (in francs) you are willing to bid
in the box with a dollar sign. Bids should be in whole francs only. After your order is specied,
you can send it to the market by selecting save. Each bid you make must have only one market
selected. You must place a bid of at least 1 franc in every market. However, you may bid as
much as you choose in any period and any market. You will have approximately two minutes
in order to submit your bids. The period will end when all bidders have place a bid in each
market. You may view your bids by clicking on the Bids button in your main window. Once all
bidders have submitted their bids, the period will be closed and the results calculated. When
the results are available, you may view the bids by clicking on the Results button in your main
window. Selecting Show will display the results.
Determination of Redemption Values
For each buyer the redemption value for each market and each period will be between 1 and
1000. In four of the ve markets, each number from 1 to 1000 has equal chance of appearing.
It is as if each number between 1 and 1000 is stamped on a single ball and placed in an urn.
A draw from the urn determines the redemption value for an individual. The ball is replaced
and a second draw determines the redemption value for another player. The redemption values
each period are determined the same way. The following is a table in which the probability of
getting a value in a certain range is listed: (It is for your reference)
Range of Redemption value Probability of a value in this range
1-100 10%
1-200 20%
1-300 30%
1-400 40%
1-500 50%
1-600 60%
1-700 70%
1-800 80%
1-900 90%
1-1000 100%
In the fth market, redemption values are drawn in a dierent manner. Redemption values
close to 1000 have a higher chance of appearing than do those close to 1. It is as if the number
1 is stamped on a single ball, 2 is stamped on 3 balls, 3 is stamped on 5 balls, and so on. For any
value n between 1and 1000, the number of balls equals 2n-1. All the balls are placed in an urn.
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A draw from the urn determines the redemption value for an individual. The ball is replaced
and a second draw determines the redemption value for another player. The redemption values
each period are determined the same way. The following is a table in which the probability of
getting a value in a certain range is listed: (It is for your reference)
Range of Redemption value Probability of a value in this range
1-100 1%
1-200 4%
1-300 9%
1-400 16%
1-500 25%
1-600 36%
1-700 49%
1-800 64%
1-900 81%
1-1000 100%
There will be one bidder whose values are drawn from this set of draws in each market. Bidder
1 will receive redemption values drawn in this manner in market A. Likewise, 2 in B, 3 in C,
4 in D, and 5 in E. For each bidder, the redemption values in the four other markets will be
given by draws determined as previously described.
Your redemption value sheet may look something like this:
A 520
B 128
C 200
D 750
E 776
This indicates that you would receive a redemption value of 520 in market A if you place the
highest bid in that market. Likewise, your value in market B would be 128 and so on. The rst
period will be practice. You will receive no earnings for this period. If you have a question,
please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer your question.
To be read after round 5
Communication with Other Participants
Sometimes in previous experiments, participants have found it useful when the opportunity
arose, to communicate with one another. You are going to be allowed this opportunity while the
computers are reset between periods. There will be some restrictions. You are free to discuss
any aspect of the experiment (or the market) that you wish, except that:
 You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private information on your value
sheets.
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 You are not allowed to discuss side payments or to use physical threats.
Since there are still some restrictions on your communications with one another, an experimenter
will monitor your discussion between periods. To make this easier, all discussions will be at this
site. Remember, after the computers have been reset between periods (and the next period has
begun) there will be no discussion until after the end of the next period. We allow a maximum
of 4 minutes in any one discussion session.
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Appendix C Bidder and Seller Surplus
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Figure 6: Experiment 1
Experiment 2
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Figure 7: Experiment 2
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Experiment 3
Reduced Bidding (10%)
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Figure 8: Experiment 3
Experiment 4
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Figure 9: Experiment 4
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Experiment 5
Bid Rotation
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Figure 10: Experiment 5
Experiment 6
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Figure 11: Experiment 6
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Experiment 7
Bid Rotation
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Figure 12: Experiment 7
Experiment 8
Bid Rotation
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Figure 13: Experiment 8
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Experiment 9
Bid Rotation
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Figure 14: Experiment 9
Experiment 10
Bid Rotation
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Figure 15: Experiment 10
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